Authentication is one among a set of services that constitute a security sub-system in a modern computing or communications infrastructure. End User Authentication flexibility model would proposed in this paper allow the user to have multiple authentication mechanisms with varying levels of guarantee, and for suppliers to request and rely on mechanisms appropriate to the service requested. Authentications to enduser in a simple three level ticket request model algorithms solution on open distributed environment. This paper describes the ticket used by clients, servers, and Kerberos to achieve authentication toward prevention of unauthorized access to in sourced data on applications level. However we explore an approach to end user authentication that generalizes the notion of a textual password that, in many cases, improves the security. Our approach is based on the use of Kerberos authentication technique and Diffie-Hellman Key exchange.
INTRODUCTION
For the vast majority of computer systems, authentication for users and passwords are the method of choice for access control security mechanism. In consumer applications as diverse as financial transactions, remote computer login, building access control, and keyless entry is extremely important for prove. With that idea in mind in distributed environment, three approaches to security can be envisioned: 1. Rely on each individual client workstations to assure the identity of its user or users and rely on each server to enforce a security policy based on user based identifications (ID). 2. Require that client system authenticate themselves to server, but trust the client system concerning the identity of its user. 3. Require the user to prove identity for each service invoked. Also require that servers prove their identity to client. Raising questions to eCommerce security this paper presents authentications and authorization service model algorithms to an end user by the use of textual password. We extend the use of the last models by Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange A NonMathematician's Explanation (Palmgren,2005) and Kerberos authentication model (Steiner et al,1998) quoting at length to place authentication in proper systems context use. 
EUA MODEL ARCHITECTURE

Message Exchange Algorithm
We analyze the semantics basing on Kerberos authentication technique key exchange (Palmgren, 2005) and Diffie-Hellman Key exchange of each security transcoding by using an online contracting scenario. 
Passwords
We represent these requirements (Jermyn et al 1999) in an authentication system consisting of five components. Components are defined inductively as follow: 1. The set A of authentication Information is the set of specific information with which entities prove their identities. 2. The set C of complementary Information is the set of information that the system stores and uses to validate the authentication information. 3. The set F of complementation functions that generate the complimentary from the authentication information that is: -
The set L of authentication functions that verify identity. That is for L, : A × C {true, false} ∈ →
The set S of selection functions that enable an entity to create or alter the authentication and complementary information.
The goal is to find an a∈ A such that, for f ∈ F, f (a) = c ∈ c and c is associated with a particular entity (or any entity).Because one can determine weather a is associated with and entity only by computing f (a) or by authenticating via | (a) we have two approaches for protecting the password, used simultaneously 1. Hide enough information so that one of a, c, or f can not be found.
Prevent access to the authentication functions L
Security Considerations
In both approaches, the goal of the defenders is to maximize the time needed to guess the password. -Let P be the probability that an attacker guess a password in specified period of time -Let G be the number of guesses that can be tested in one time unit -Let T be the number of time units during which guessing occurs -Let N be the number of possible passwords Then 
Thus we must choose an integer s such that
This holds when ≥ s 6 so, to meet the desired conditions password of at least length 6 must be required. Assumptions underlie example: 1. The time required to test a password is constant 2. All passwords are equally likely to be selected Proof: (a) The first is reasonable, because the algorithms used to validate password are fixed and either the algorithm are independent of the password's length or the variation is negligible. (b) The second assumption is a function of the password selection mechanism. (Morris and Thomson, 1979) 
One -time Passwords
One time password is a password that is invalidated as soon as it is used. It uses techniques first suggested to generate the password. (Lamport, 1981) With this technology our System takes the "seed" user enters and generates a list of n passwords.
The implementation presents each password as a sequence of six shorts words (but the internal presentation is an Integer). 1. User supplies his name to the server 2. The server replies with the number i stored in the ticket file 3. User supplies the corresponding password pi 4. The server computes ( ) ( ) h p =h k =k = p ni+1 i ni+2 il and compares the results with the stored password. If they match, the ticket file to i1 and stores Pi in the file. If the authentication fails the ticket file is left unchanged Note: h -one-way hash function, K -Seed.
Performance Analysis
We will derive and analyze the robustness of passwords capabilities by probability letting unauthorized end-user guessing capability to allow its login within a particular time. Parameters: X: password length, Z: time.
The probability that randomly guessed capability will pass a particular authorization is given by ( )
and the probability that a randomly guessed capability will pass all d authorization in a system is
Recall that the capability password authorization must be > than 6 symbols (characters). Figure 2 and 3 shows login performance over time and different password length.
We leave the exact timing decisions to s 6 ≥ symbols, and simply assume in our experiments that x is likely to be from two to six. From the graph the probability log in comes close to matches as the numbers of input values increases within different time. The performance is excellently, 97.14% of the attack using short key length per log in from ( ) z = 1 , and increasing probability to 100% of login match to key length ≥ six with a marking of running time ( )
As we show in figure 3, X must be at least 2, because a valid capability is 100% that matches any of the X capabilities in the DBMS, small value of X provide the smallest probability that a randomly chosen capability will match the password. 
The max m metric defines the longest amount of time that passwords matches can remain idle and still have a valid capability. Put in another way, M ax m defines the maximum amount of time that an attacker can login with particular capability before the capability is rejected by authentications. Because the (login denial) rejection probabilities are independent Bernoulli trials the probability that the end user/client and server will be able to establish correct password after one try (by exchanging password is:
The probability that client will connect after K tries is:-P (connection after K tries) = k 1 - (1 -P (connect after 1 try) )
For a given desire connection probability, P (connect) the required numbers of connection attempts is:- 
A nice feature of this formula is that the expected number of connections attempts depends logarithmically on the matches' probability, which indicates that even for large i ∈ ; a determined client can get a connected after a moderate waiting time.
CONCLUSION
We have presented an algorithm that explains the ticket message exchange for access to an end user in distributed systems. Using this model as a basis, we also present a countermeasure that may be deployed in the current passwords used, assuming that client and server software is updated.
Our approaches exploit the input capabilities of login that allow us to determine inputs time from the passwords length in which it occurs. We prove our arguments to assess the security mathematically.
